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I.   QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
Did the district court err in finding the shareholder agreements, 
containing partially restrictive covenants not to compete, unenforceable 
because they lacked an essential term, were “agreements to agree,” and 
were unconscionable contracts of adhesion? If the district court did err—
and the shareholder agreements are enforceable—are the partially 
restrictive covenants not to compete reasonable under Dobbins, DeGuire 
& Tucher, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald and Olson,1 and can the 
employer show a legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenants 
under Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.?2  
This case is noteworthy because Montana law is unsettled on the 
issue of whether an employer has a legitimate business interest in 
enforcing a restrictive covenant when the employee chooses to end the 
employment relationship. If the Court reaches that issue, this case could 
guide attorneys in drafting enforceable partially restrictive covenants not 
to compete. 
  
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Montana accounting firm Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, 
Stevens, P.C. (“JCCS”) brought this action alleging Terry Alborn, Paul 
Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp 
(“Shareholders”) breached their Shareholder’s Employment Agreements 
(“Agreements”) and fiduciary duties to JCCS.3  
JCCS was established in 1946 in Great Falls and has expanded 
throughout Montana by merging with and acquiring various accounting 
firms.4 JCCS wished to expand to Bozeman and in the year 2000 began 
merger discussions with Bozeman firm Veltkamp, Stannebein & Bateson, 
P.C. (“VSB”).5 The two entities eventually merged on January 1, 2002; 
JCCS paid for VSB’s assets with JCCS shares and VSB dissolved.6 VSB 
                                           
1 708 P.2d 557 (Mont. 1985). 
2 265 P.3d 646 (Mont. 2011). 
3 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, 
Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and 
Sherm Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellant’s%20 
Opening%20–%20Brief?id=%7BF05C4752-0000-CE17-BD41-BE04DF468C34%7D (Mont. Jan. 
14, 2016) (No. DA 15-0605). 
4 Id. at 3. 
5 Id. at 4. 
6 Id. 
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had four shareholders at the time of the merger: Uithoven, Bateson, 
Veltkamp, and Stannebien, All four became JCCS shareholders.7 Alborn 
became a JCCS shareholder in 1980 and moved to the Bozeman JCCS 
branch after the merger with VSB.8  
The Shareholders signed identical Agreements following the 
merger.9 The Agreements were for a term of one year, but a vote of 75% 
of the directors could terminate them without cause.10 The Agreements 
provided for compensation a “mutually agreeable amount.”11 
Additionally, the Agreements contained a partially restrictive covenant not 
to compete, confined to the instant and any contiguous county.12 Partially 
restrictive covenants not to compete infringe upon, but do not 
unequivocally prohibit, one’s right to perform his or her trade. The 
covenant stated, in pertinent part:  
If this Agreement is terminated for any reason and the Shareholder 
provides professional services in . . . competition with JCCS, the 
Shareholder agrees . . . to pay JCCS an amount equal to one hundred 
(100%) percent of the gross fees billed by JCCS to a particular client over 
the twelve month period immediately preceding such termination . . .13  
All JCCS shareholders signed new Agreements on July 1, 2011.14 
Subsequently, the Agreements were extended by one year on July 1, 
2012.15 Therefore, the Agreements were set to expire on June 30, 2013.16  
In 2013, the Shareholders voluntarily left JCCS after meeting with 
an independent consultant and having discussed their decision to leave 
with JCCS.17 Shareholder Alborn directed a JCCS employee to download 
JCCS’s electronic client list in June 2013.18 The Shareholders formed a 
new accounting firm, Amatics CPA Group, which opened on July 1, 
2013.19 Amatics advertised and sent solicitation letters to JCCS’s 
Bozeman clients.20 Over the next year, 2,100 of JCCS’s 2,400 Bozeman 
clients moved their business to Amatics.21  
                                           
7 Appellee’s Brief at 3, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, 
Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm 
Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellee’s%20Response 
%20–%20Brief?id=%7B601BF652-0000-CD10-B8D0-56BEE9239902%7D (Mont. Feb. 12, 2016) 
(No. DA 15-0605). 
8 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4. 
9 Id. at 5; Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3. 
10 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 5–6. 




18 Id. at 5. 
19 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 10. 
20 Id. at 12. 
21 Id. 
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The Bozeman JCCS office eventually closed.22 JCCS then 
commenced this action, seeking declaratory judgment enforcing the 
Agreements’ covenants not to compete and alleging numerous causes of 
action, including breach of contract.23 Both parties moved for summary 
judgment on JCCS’s action for declaratory judgment and breach of 
contract claim. The district court granted the Shareholder’s motion 
(thereby denying JCCS’s motion), finding the Agreements unenforceable 
because they lacked an essential term (compensation), were “agreements 
to agree,” and were unconscionable contracts of adhesion.24 Because the 
district court found the Agreements unenforceable, it held they could not 
serve as basis for JCCS’s breach of contract claim.25 Therefore, the district 
court never reached the issue of whether the partially restrictive covenants 
in the Agreements were reasonable.26 JCCS now appeals the district 
court’s ruling. There are multiple issues on appeal, including fiduciary 
duty owed, breach of fiduciary duty, proof of damages, and attorneys’ fees. 
However, the pivotal issue discussed below is that of the Agreements’ 
partially restrictive covenants not to compete.  
 
III.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.   Appellant Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. 
 
1.  The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to the 
Shareholders on the Basis That the Agreements Are Unenforceable.  
 
JCCS argues the district court erred when it found the Agreements 
unenforceable because they lacked an essential term, were “agreements to 
agree,” and were unconscionable contracts of adhesion.  
JCCS asserts the Agreements had all essential terms. JCCS 
contends the district court improperly relied on distinguishable case law 
to conclude compensation was not adequately contemplated in the 
Agreements.27 JCCS asserts the Shareholders were compensated for their 
work pursuant to the Agreements.28 Additionally, JCCS argues the amount 
of the Shareholders’ salary is irrelevant to the issue of whether the partially 
restrictive covenant is enforceable, thus asserting that the covenant is not 
made unenforceable by the mere omission of a dollar figure.29  
                                           
22 Id. 
23 Id.; Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
24 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 10. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 30. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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JCCS asserts the Agreements are not “agreements to agree.”30 
JCCS argues that the amount of the employee’s salary does not need to be 
included in the Agreement because the amount of the employee’s salary is 
not consideration for the covenant not to compete.31 Instead, the 
employment itself is the consideration.32 Therefore, JCCS concludes the 
Agreement contemplates the parties’ full agreement.33  
Supported by eight peer accounting firms as amici curiae, JCCS 
also argues that the Agreements are not unconscionable contracts of 
adhesion.34 JCCS argues the Agreements are not contracts of adhesion 
because the Shareholders were not in an inferior bargaining position as 
officers, shareholders, and in the case of one shareholder, a director.35 
JCCS asserts the Shareholders were on equal footing with JCCS to speak 
up about changes they wished to make to the covenants.36 JCCS contends 
the Agreements were effectively agreements the Shareholders entered into 
with themselves and not unconscionable contracts of adhesion.37  
 
2.  The District Court Erred in Not Granting Summary Judgment to 
JCCS under Dobbins and Its Progeny.  
 
The district court found the Agreements unenforceable and 
therefore did not reach the issue of whether the partially restrictive 
covenants are reasonable.38 JCCS contends this is reversible error and that 
the district court should have considered whether the covenant satisfies 
Dobbins’ reasonableness test.39 JCCS argues that public policy favors its 
position because an employer must be able to “protect its client base from 
depletion by a former employee.”40 JCCS states, “Montana businesses rely 
on the enforceability of covenants like the one here every day.”41 JCCS 
further contends that failing to uphold the covenant in the Agreement 
would “preclude Montana businesses from competing in the modern 
world.”42  
                                           
30 Id. at 30–31. 
31 Id. at 31. 
32 Id. 
33 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 31. 
34 Id. at 33–34. 
35 Id. at 36. 
36 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 13, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, 
Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm 
Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Appellant%20Reply%20–
%20Brief?id=%7B40DE6753-0000-CF16-9242-C5D987664393%7D (Mont. March 11, 2016) (No. 
DA 15-0605). 
37 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 36. 
38 Id. at 33. 
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JCCS argues its partially restrictive covenant is enforceable 
because it is consistent with the Court’s holding in Dobbins and its 
progeny.43 The threshold question in determining enforceability is whether 
the covenant is a reasonable restraint on trade.44 JCCS argues that its 
covenant is a reasonable restraint on trade because: (1) it is limited in 
operation to time and place; (2) is based on good consideration in the 
Shareholder’s salary and employment; and (3) affords reasonable 
protection for and does not impose an unreasonable burden on the 
employer, employee, or the public.45  
JCCS also argues it has a legitimate business reason to enforce the 
covenants, pursuant to Wrigg.46 A legitimate business reason exists when 
the restriction is necessary to protect the employer’s goodwill, customer 
relationships, or trade information.47 JCCS acknowledges that precedent 
shows covenants are only appropriate when a less restrictive measure will 
not suffice and argues there are no less restrictive means to protect JCCS’s 
business in this instance.48 JCCS argues the Shareholders gained an unfair 
advantage when they solicited JCCS’s customers after voluntarily leaving 
their employment with JCCS.49 JCCS contends it intentionally did not 
discharge the Shareholders or lock its client lists and confidential 
information because it knew doing so would have violated Wrigg and 
resulted in no recovery under the covenants.50 JCCS emphasizes that the 
Shareholders chose to leave their employment and argues a partial 
restriction on trade should be held reasonable when an employee initiates 
their termination.51  
 
B.   Appellee Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul 
Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp 
 
1.  The District Court Did Not Err in Granting the Shareholders’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment Because the Agreements Are 
Unenforceable.  
 
The Shareholders contend the district court properly granted 
summary judgment because the Agreements did not contain all essential 
terms, were “agreements to agree,” and are unconscionable contracts of 
                                           
43 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 22. 
44 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 23, citing Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 221 P.3d 
1230 (Mont. 2009). 
45 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 24–25. 
46 Id. at 25; Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 651. 
47 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 26. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 27. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 26–27. 
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adhesion. The Shareholders remind the Court that agreements restraining 
a profession are disfavored in Montana.52  
The Shareholders argue the Agreements are unenforceable 
because they do not contain an essential term to the contract: 
compensation.53 The Shareholders contend the compensation term in the 
Agreements is incomplete because it fails to “include the Shareholder’s 
compensation or a mode or means to calculate it.”54 Additionally, the 
Shareholders assert they were not fully compensated because their 2013 
bonuses went unpaid after JCCS discovered the Shareholder’s plan to 
leave.55 Likewise, the Shareholders argue the district court properly 
considered the Agreements as “agreements to agree” because they do not 
specify compensation or a means to determine it.56  
The Shareholders also contend the Agreements are 
unconscionable contracts of adhesion and support their contention with 
three main arguments.57 First, the Shareholders argue they had no 
meaningful choice but to sign the Agreements because they were 
employees in a weaker bargaining position and were forced to sign a 
standard form that all shareholders signed without any negotiation.58 
Second, the Shareholders argue the terms are more favorable to JCCS for 
various reasons, the most prevalent being that the damage payment to 
JCCS of 100% of gross fees billed by JCCS to a particular client in the 
previous year does not reflect JCCS’s actual damages.59 Third, the 
Shareholders argue the covenant not to compete is outside of the 
Shareholder’s reasonable expectations because they reasonably believed it 
would only apply if the Agreements were terminated—not if the 
Agreements expired.60  
Finally, the Shareholders argue the covenant not to compete does 
not apply to them because it only applies upon termination, not term 
expiration, and they were not terminated. Instead, the Agreements had 
expired on June 30, 2013.61  
 
                                           
52 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 12. 
53 Id. at 12–13. 
54 Id. at 13. 
55 Id. at 14. 
56 Id. at 14–15. 
57 Id. at 15. 
58 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 17; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae at 2, 
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, 
Paul Uithoven, Christina Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp , 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-0605%20Supplemental%20–
%20Brief?id=%7B10B62D53-0000-CE13-924C-7F4D95F87002%7D (Mont. Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 
DA 15-0605). 
59 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 17. 
60 Id. at 19; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 58, at 4. 
61 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 19. 
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2.  Even If the Agreements Are Enforceable, the District Court Did 
Not Err in Denying JCCS’s Motion for Summary Judgment Because There 
Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact.  
 
The Shareholders argue that even if the Court determines the 
district court erred in finding the Agreements unenforceable, JCCS’s 
motion for summary judgment should still be denied because there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to the adequacy of consideration, the 
reasonableness of the partially restrictive covenant, and the legitimacy of 
JCCS’s business interest.62  
The Shareholders contend that if the contract is considered 
enforceable, questions of fact exist regarding whether the covenant not to 
compete is reasonable.63 The Shareholders argue, pursuant to Dobbins, 
Mungas, and Wrigg, the reasonableness of a partially restrictive covenant 
is a question of fact and therefore should not be decided on a motion for 
summary judgment.64 Additionally, the Shareholders argue that the 
liquidated damage clause requires the Shareholders to pay an 
unreasonably large amount to JCCS for breach of the covenant.65  
The Shareholders also disagree with JCCS’s reported legitimate 
business interest in the covenant not to compete.66 The Shareholders argue 
JCCS had an opportunity to prepare its Bozeman clients for the 
Shareholders’ departure and that JCCS expected the Shareholders to 
download their firm’s client list.67 Additionally, the Shareholders argue 
JCCS does not have a legitimate business interest to restrict the 
Shareholders’ trade because clients have the right to choose their 
accountants; therefore, as a matter of public policy, an accountant cannot 
be bound by a covenant not to compete that effectively prevents an 
accountant from providing services to the client.68 The Shareholders assert 
the fact they voluntarily left JCCS is not relevant to JCCS’s legitimate 
business reason because the Shareholders worked through the end of their 
Agreements, a distinguishing fact from Wrigg.69 Finally, the Shareholders 
argue JCCS does not have a legitimate business interest in client 
relationships that were gained before the Shareholders joined JCCS, and 
many of the clients employed VSB before its merger with JCCS.70  
 
C.   Amici Curiae Accounting Firms in Support of Appellant 
 
                                           
62 Id. at 24–26, 29. 
63 Id. at 27. 
64 Id. at 25. 
65 Id. at 28. 
66 Id. at 29. 
67 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 30. 
68 Id. at 31; Appellees’ Brief in Response to Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 58, at 7. 
69 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 7, at 31. 
70 Id. at 32. 
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Eight Montana accounting firms (“Accounting Firms”) filed an 
Amicus Brief supporting JCCS.71 The Accounting Firms had regularly 
used restrictive covenants and assert the Court’s holding in this case could 
impact the restrictive covenants normally utilized in the accounting 
profession.72 The Accounting Firms argue the Agreements are not per se 
unconscionable contracts of adhesion.73 They support their position by 
arguing: (1) the bargaining positions of the parties were not vastly 
unequal;74 (2) this type of restrictive covenant is within the reasonable 
expectations of Montana accountants;75 (3) this type of restrictive 
covenant is not contrary to public policy as a matter of law;76 and (4) the 
restrictive covenant does not violate the ethical rules applicable to 
accountants.77 The Accounting Firms emphasize this restrictive covenant 
is consistent with Dobbins and its progeny because it does not prohibit the 
Shareholders from practicing their profession; it just requires them to 
compensate JCCS when they take JCCS’s clients to another firm.78  
The Accounting Firms also assert the amount of liquidated 
damages is reasonable and not unconscionable when comparing the terms 
in the present case to those in Dobbins—which were considered 
reasonable.79 The Accounting Firms argue that liquidated damages for a 
breach of a restrictive covenant are frequently aligned with the cost to 
purchase an accounting practice because that is what, in essence, is 
occurring.80 The Accounting Firms argue the reasonableness is further 
reinforced by the fact the Shareholders can make payments over a three-
year period.81 For these reasons, the Accounting Firms request the Court 
reverse the district court’s order to the extent it concludes that the 
restrictive covenant is an unconscionable contract of adhesion.82  
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
The Court is reviewing this issue de novo and therefore will likely 
inquire as to both the enforceability of the Agreements and the 
reasonableness of the covenants. The Court will first consider whether the 
                                           
71 Brief of Amici Curiae Accounting Firms Supporting Appellant at 2, Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, 
Stevens, P.C. v. Alborn, Uithoven, Riekenberg, P.C., Terry Alborn, Paul Uithoven, Christina 
Riekenberg, Joe Bateson, and Sherm Veltkamp , https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2015-
0605%20Amicus%20–%20Brief?id=%7BC080B352-0000-CC17-85F2-BB75E2E16085%7D 
(Mont. Feb. 5, 2016) (No. DA 15-0605). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 4. 
74 Id. at 5. 
75 Id. at 6. 
76 Id. at 9. 
77 Brief of Amici Curiae Accounting Firms, supra note 71, at 13. 
78 Id. at 12. 
79 Id. at 14, 16. 
80 Id. at 17. 
81 Id. at 18. 
82 Id. 
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Agreements are enforceable. If it decides the Agreements are enforceable 
it will then consider the legitimacy of the partially restrictive covenants 
not to compete.  
As to the enforceability, expect questions from the Court 
clarifying the compensation term due to its importance for both the 
essential term and “agreement to agree” issues. To aid it in determining 
whether the contract is an unconscionable contract of adhesion, the Court 
may inquire about the Agreement’s one-year term, the procedure for 
renewing the term, and the reasonableness of the liquidated damages 
provision. JCCS likely has a stronger argument on appeal even though the 
district court granted the Shareholders’ motion for summary judgment. 
JCCS’s contention that the contract is not an unconscionable contract of 
adhesion is well supported in its briefs and further accredited by the 
Accounting Firms.  
Montana, generally, disfavors restraint on trade. Covenants not to 
compete are statutorily barred, subject to only a few exceptions.83 Even 
when the statutory exceptions do not apply, the Montana Supreme Court 
has permitted indirect covenants not to compete in only a few narrow 
instances. In Dobbins v. Rutherford, the Court held a covenant not to 
compete enforceable if it is an indirect, reasonable restraint on trade.84 A 
reasonable restraint is one that: (1) is restricted in operation as to time or 
place; (2) is based on good consideration; and (3) reasonably protects the 
employer but does not unreasonably burden the employee or public.85  
Dobbins was further narrowed in Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, 
Campanella, Stevens, P.C., where the Court held a reasonable covenant 
not to compete shall only be upheld where the employer can show a 
legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenant.86 The Court noted 
that an employer “normally lacks a legitimate business interest in a 
covenant when it chooses to end the employment relationship.”87 Neither 
Wrigg nor any decision since has addressed the issue of whether an 
employer has a legitimate business interest in enforcing a covenant when 
an employee initiates and voluntarily leaves his or her employment, 
leaving a gap in Montana law. That issue is precisely what the Court has 
the opportunity to address in this case. The Shareholders left JCCS at their 
own volition, and this case is an opportunity for the Court to clarify what 
legitimate business interest an employer has when enforcing a covenant 
not to compete when the employee leaves the employment relationship. 
JCCS makes a convincing argument that, based on Montana case law, this 
is the type of legitimate business interest that would support enforcing a 
covenant not to compete.  
                                           
83 See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 28–2–703 to 28–2–705 (2015). 
84 Dobbins, 708 P.2d at 580. 
85 Id. 
86 Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 653. 
87 Id. at 653. 
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If the Court chooses to address this issue, its clarification will aid 
attorneys in interpreting Montana’s fact-intensive restrictive covenant 
case law. Clarification is important so attorneys may competently draft 
covenants not to compete that will be enforced by Montana courts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
